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WISHFUL THINKING IN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTS
MUHAMET YILDIZ
Abstract. Towards developing a theory of systematic biases about strate-
gies, I analyze strategic implications of a particular bias: wishful thinking
about the strategies. Considering canonical state spaces for strategic uncer-
tainty, I identify a player as a wishful thinker at a state if she hopes to enjoy
the highest payoﬀ that is consistent with her information about the others’
strategies at that state. I develop a straightforward elimination process that
characterizes the strategy proﬁles that are consistent with wishful thinking,
mutual knowledge of wishful thinking, and so on. Every pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium is consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking. For
generic two-person games, I further show that the pure Nash equilibrium
strategies are the only strategies that are consistent with common knowl-
edge of wishful thinking, providing an unusual epistemic characterization for
equilibrium strategies. I also investigate the strategic implications of rational-
ity and ex-post optimism, the situation in which a player’s expected payoﬀ
weakly exceeds her actual payoﬀ. I show that these strategic implications
are generically identical to those of wishful thinking whenever each player’s
payoﬀ is monotone in others’ strategies.
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1. Introduction
Self-serving biases, such as optimism and wishful thinking, are reportedly
common among economic agents.
1 There is a burgeoning theoretical literature
that investigates the role of such optimistic and heterogeneous beliefs in eco-
nomic applications, such as ﬁnancial markets (Harrison and Kreps (1978), Mor-
ris (1996)), bargaining (Posner (1972), Landes (1971), Yildiz (2003,2004), Ali
(2003)), collective action (Wilson (1968), Banerjee and Somanathan (2001)),
lending (Manove and Padilla (1999)), and theory of the ﬁrm (van den Steen
(2002)). Another line of research has already set out to test these theories empir-
ically (e.g., Farber and Bazerman (1989)). These models all assume that players
hold heterogeneous priors about some underlying parameters, and then apply
equilibrium analysis. But equilibrium analysis assumes that players correctly
guess the other players’ strategies
2–a suspect assumption in above applications
when equilibrium is not derived from some reasonable dominance conditions.
Indeed, Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2004) demonstrate that it is hard to
interpret such equilibria as outcomes of a learning process.
Most observers agree that it is often harder to predict the outcome of strate-
gic interactions than predicting some physical reality. After all, present theories
in physical sciences have much sharper predictions than the theories in social
sciences, and well-grounded game-theoretical solution concepts have weak pre-
dictive power. This suggests that it would be methodologically preferable to
model players having heterogenous beliefs about strategic uncertainty when-
ever they have heterogenous priors about the underlying parameters of the real
world. In particular, it seems more likely that players have more substantial
1The literature is large. For some examples, see Larwood and Wittaker (1977), Weinstein
(1980), and Babcock and Loewenstein (1997). Self-serving biases disappear in some experi-
ments that control for strategic reporting (Bar-Hillel and Budescu (1995), Kaplan and Ruﬄe
(2004)).
2Even when there is uncertainty about strategies in the form of mixed strategies, in order to
justify equilibrium analysis, one needs to make similar assumptions, such as mutual knowledge
of players’ conjectures–which implies that players guess other players’ conjectures correctly–
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self-serving biases about the strategies of others instead of about physical re-
ality. Metaphorically, one would expect that an individual who buys a lottery
ticket believing in her luck would also drive over the speed limit and get a
speeding ticket, believing that a police oﬃcer would forgive her. It is unfortu-
nate then that we do not have a theory of strategic interaction that incorporates
self-serving biases about the others’ strategies. This paper takes a step towards
such a theory, by analyzing two benchmark cases, namely: wishful thinking
and ex-post optimism. Taking the dictionary deﬁnition of wishful thinking (i.e.,
identiﬁcation of one’s wishes or desires with reality) literally, I will use this term
to refer precisely to the extreme case of optimism.
Let me emphasize that non-equilibrium analysis, which allows for heteroge-
neous priors about the others’ strategies, is one of the most developed areas in
game theory. We have solution concepts, such as rationalizability (Bernheim
(1984), Pearce (1984)). We have many models of strategic uncertainty, and
we know how to check whether the players share a common prior about the
others’ strategies (Aumann (1976,1987), Feinberg (2000)). Nevertheless, we do
not have a theory that analyzes systematic deviations from the common-prior
assumption, such as optimism, about the others’ strategies. Such systematic
deviations are the subject matter of this paper. The standard models of strate-
gic uncertainty do contain types with optimism, pessimism, or wishful thinking,
but no special attention has been paid to these types. I will simply identify
these types and investigate their behavior.
I will use Aumann’s (1976) canonical partition model for strategic uncertainty
to identify whether a player is a wishful thinker. In this model, at any state,
there is a unique strategy proﬁle to be played. Players do not necessarily know
the state. At each state, each player has an information cell consisting of the
states that she cannot rule out at that state. This cell represents the set of
correct assumptions that she takes as given, which is sometimes referred to as
her outside information. She also has a (conditional) probability distribution
on this cell, which is taken to represent her “subjective” beliefs (about other
players’ strategies, etc.)4 MUHAMET YILDIZ
Consider an information cell of a player. This player takes the set of strategy
proﬁles played by the other players on this cell as given. She also knows that
she can choose any strategy from the set of her own strategies. The product of
these two sets is the set of all possible outcomes according to the information
cell. I identify a player as a wishful thinker at a state if her expected payoﬀ
(according to her own probability distribution) at that state coincides with the
highest possible expected payoﬀ one can ever expect within the set of these
possible outcomes.
This formalization has two noteworthy properties. Firstly, wishful thinking
is a property of the information cell. Therefore, whenever a player is to be
identiﬁed as a wishful thinker, she knows that an outside observer identiﬁes
her as such (although she would probably not accept that she is aﬄicted with
the psychological anomaly of wishful thinking). Secondly, a wishful thinker’s
strategy-belief pair maximizes her expected payoﬀ among all such pairs. In par-
ticular, her strategy maximizes her expected payoﬀ given her beliefs. Hence, she
must be rational. While wishful thinking is popularly considered to be a form
of irrationality involving self deception and misperception of the world, wishful
thinking formally implies the standard game-theoretical notion of rationality.
In application, we are mostly interested in the strategic implications of wish-
ful thinking. We also want to know how these implications change when wishful
thinking is mutually known, when this mutual knowledge is mutually known,
and so on. It is especially important to understand the implications of com-
mon knowledge of wishful thinking. This is ﬁrstly because the strategy proﬁles
that are consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking
3 are also con-
sistent with mutual knowledge of wishful thinking at arbitrary order, and hence
these are the strategy proﬁl e st h a tr e m a i np o s s i b l ea sw ea l l o wm o r ea n dm o r e
knowledge of wishful thinking. More importantly, it is highly desirable from a
methodological point of view to disentangle the implications of heterogeneous
priors or self-serving biases from those of asymmetric information. Researchers,
3As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle is consistent with (common knowledge of) wishful thinking means that
there is a model and a state at which the strategy proﬁle is played and (it is common knowledge
that) the players are wishful thinkers.WISHFUL THINKING 5
such as those in the literature discussed above, commonly accomplish this by
assuming that there is no asymmetric information.
4 (This also allows the re-
searcher to focus on belief diﬀerences without having to deal with asymmetric
information.) In keeping with this methodology, it is desirable to examine the
implications of wishful thinking when there is no asymmetric information about
it–i.e., when wishful thinking is common knowledge.
Unfortunately, it is often too cumbersome to determine such implications
through an epistemic model, which consists of a state space, partitions and
conditional probability distributions. More problematically, the set of impli-
cations often depends on the model, as models often contain many “common
knowledge” assumptions. To overcome this, I develop a straightforward iterated
elimination process on the strategy proﬁles that characterizes the strategies that
are consistent with wishful thinking, mutual knowledge of wishful thinking, and
so on. The application of this procedure allows a researcher to use wishful
thinking–the extreme form of optimism–as an alternative benchmark to equi-
librium.
To ﬁx the ideas, consider the simple case of the battle of the sexes game:
lr
t 2,1 0,0
b 0,0 1,2
The strategy proﬁle (b,l) is inconsistent with wishful thinking. To see this,
suppose that there is a model with a state at which player 1 is a wishful thinker
and the outcome is (b,l). At this state player 1 must expect the payoﬀ of 1;
a wishful thinker always plays a best reply to a pure strategy. But since (b,l)
is the outcome at this state, it is possible that player 2 plays l according to
the information cell of player 1. Hence, player 1 could have hoped a higher
payoﬀ of 2, by believing that player 2 plays l and playing t in response–a
contradiction. Hence the strategy proﬁle (b,l) is eliminated. All the remaining
strategy proﬁles are consistent with wishful thinking and in fact with common
knowledge of wishful thinking. To see this, consider a model in which the states
4See Squintani (2001) for an exception.6 MUHAMET YILDIZ
are the remaining three strategy proﬁles, and each player knows only her own
strategy. For example, at a state in which player 1 plays t,s h eﬁnds both l and
r possible. As a wishful thinker, she assigns probability 1 to the state at which
player 2 plays l. A tt h es t a t ea tw h i c hs h ep l a y sb,s h eﬁnds only r possible.
The only belief she can entertain here assigns probability 1 to r. Since she plays
a best reply to this belief, she is a wishful thinker at this state, too. Similarly,
player 2 is also a wishful thinker at all states. Since both players are wishful
thinkers at all states, it is common knowledge that they are wishful thinkers.
Hence, the elimination procedure ends here.
Since wishful thinking implies rationality, only rationalizable strategies can be
consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking, and non-rationalizable
strategies are eventually eliminated. It turns out that there is a strong rela-
tionship between common knowledge of wishful thinking and Nash equilibria in
pure strategies. Firstly, every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is consistent with
common knowledge of wishful thinking, simply because it does not leave any
room for any strategic uncertainty (and the players are rational). Hence, they
survive the elimination process. More interestingly, for generic,5 two-person
games, I show that if a strategy is not played in a pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium, then it must be eliminated, eventually. That is, each strategy that is
consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking must be played in some
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. This yields a characterization: a strategy is
consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking if and only if it is played
in a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. This becomes especially surprising when
one recognizes that the analysis of wishful thinking is naturally sensitive to
strategically irrelevant transformations, such as adding 2 to the payoﬀ of player
1 when player 2 plays r in the battle of the sexes. This characterization illus-
trates that, unlike most existing iterative elimination processes, such as iterated
5Since wishful thinking is an ordinal notion (Remark 2), the precise assumptions are ordinal
and much milder than full genericity assumption in normal form. The precise assumptions
are (i) each player has a unique best reply for each pure strategy of the other player and
(ii) player 1 is never indiﬀerent between two pure strategy proﬁles at which she plays a best
response to the strategy of player 2.WISHFUL THINKING 7
dominance, the elimination process above leads to strong predictions. Notice,
however, that the predictions are not so strong as to imply equilibrium out-
comes, as the equilibrium strategies played by diﬀerent players need not match.
For example, in the battle of the sexes, the non-equilibrium strategy proﬁle (t,r)
is consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking. At that state, each
player plays according to her favorite equilibrium, believing that her favorite
equilibrium is to be played. It turns out that, in generic two-person games, it is
possible to compute the set of strategy proﬁles that are consistent with common
knowledge of wishful thinking by applying the elimination process only once to
the product set of equilibrium strategies.
The above characterization suggests that wishful thinking may become com-
mon knowledge only in strategic situations in which there is not much room for
wishful thinking, when wishful thinking has little impact on players’ beliefs. The
strategic uncertainty is reduced to the uncertainty about the equilibrium that is
to be played. This does not, however, mean that strategic uncertainty needs to
vanish. At the states in which the outcome is not an equilibrium (but wishful
thinking is common knowledge), the players have substantial uncertainty about
which equilibrium is played and exhibit a clear form of wishful thinking.
This characterization also provides partial support for the theoretical litera-
ture that uses equilibrium analysis to study the behavior of optimistic players.
It shows that if a researcher allows wishful thinking but sticks to the methodol-
ogy in this literature (for the motivation above), then she can simply focus on
equilibrium strategies. The support is partial because (i) this is true only for
generic two-person games while the above models are typically non-generic and
(ii) outcomes need not be equilibria due to mismatch, and economic implications
of these proﬁles may substantially diﬀer.
It turns out that the analysis of wishful thinking is easily extended to a
natural notion of optimism, namely ex-post optimism. A player is said to be
e x - p o s to p t i m i s t i ca tas t a t ei fh e re x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ at that state weakly exceeds
her actual payoﬀ at the state. A player need not know that she is ex-post
optimistic. When it is mutually known that players are ex-post optimistic,8 MUHAMET YILDIZ
however, she knows that she is ex-post optimistic. In that case, her expected
payoﬀ must be equal to the highest payoﬀ in her information cell, exhibiting
a somewhat weaker form of wishful thinking. I slightly modify the elimination
procedure for wishful thinking to characterize the set of strategy proﬁles that
are consistent with common knowledge of rationality and ex-post optimism.
I further show that when each player’s payoﬀ function is monotonic in other
players’ strategies, generically, these two elimination procedures are equivalent.
That is, the strategic implications of rationality and the knowledge of one’s
own ex-post optimism are the same as those of wishful thinking. In particular,
in a generic, two-person, monotonic game, the strategic uncertainty is reduced
to the uncertainty about which equilibrium is played whenever it is common
knowledge that players are rational and ex-post optimistic.
A number of authors have developed general game theoretical models that
incorporate deviations from expected utility maximization and psychological
motivations (such as Geanakoplos, Pearce, Stacchetti (1989)). These models led
to incorporation of non-traditional motivations, such as fairness (Rabin (1993)),
into game theory. Eyster and Rabin (2000) propose an “equilibrium” notion in
which players underestimate the correlation between the other players’ action
and private information while they correctly estimate the distribution of actions.
Rostek (2004) proposes some set-valued solution concepts and discusses various
decision rules on these sets. One of these decision rules reﬂects wishful thinking,
though with a somewhat diﬀerent formulation.
I formulate the problem in the next section and investigate the strategic
implications of wishful thinking in Section 3. In Section 4, I deﬁne ex-post
optimism and investigate its strategic implications. Section 5 concludes. The
proofs are relegated to a technical appendix.WISHFUL THINKING 9
2. Formulation
Consider a game (N,S,u) where N = {1,2,...,n} is the set of players, S =
S1 ×···×Sn is the ﬁnite set of strategy proﬁles,6 and ui : S → R is the
utility function of player i for each i ∈ N. In this set up, players well may have
asymmetric information or heterogeneous priors about the physical parameters.7
These aspects are suppressed in the notation, in order to focus on strategic
uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty is modeled through a triple (Ω,I,p),w h i c hi s
called a model. Here, Ω is a state space that represents the players’ uncertainty
about the strategies, where a generic member ω ∈ Ω contains all information
about players’ strategies, including what each player knows. For each i ∈ N,
Ii is the information partition of player i;Iw r i t eIi (ω) for the information cell
that contains ω.H e r e ,Ii (ω) is the set of states that are indistinguishable from
ω according to player i. An information partition may be interpreted in two
ways. First, it may represent all the “objective” information player i has. In this
interpretation, at ω,p l a y e ri knows that one of the states in Ii (ω) occurs but
cannot rule out any of these states. Alternatively, one may take an information
partition as a representation of possible sets of assumptions a player may take
as given. In this interpretation, Ii (ω) corresponds to states at which a certain
set of assumptions holds. Given any event F ⊆ Ω,
Ki (F)={ω|Ii (ω) ⊆ F}
denotes the set of states at which player i knows that F occurs. The mutual
k n o w l e d g ea ta n yo r d e rm ≥ 0 is represented by operator Km where K0 (F)=F
and Km (F)=∩i∈NKi (Km−1 (F)). The set of states at which F is common
knowledge is denoted by CK(F).W r i t eσi (ω) for the strategy played by player
i at state ω.E a c hp l a y e rk n o w sh e rs t r a t e g ys ot h a tσi is constant on each cell
Ii (ω).
6I use the notational convention of x =( x1,...,x n) ∈ X1 × ··· × Xn, x−i =
(x1,...,x i−1,x i+1,...,x n) ∈ X−i = Πj6=iXj,a n dx =( xi,x −i).
7The strategic-form representation here allows chance moves, about which players’ may
have non-common priors.10 MUHAMET YILDIZ
At ω,p l a y e ri also has a probability distribution pi,ω on Ii (ω),r e p r e s e n t i n g
her beliefs about the state of the world. The expectation operator with respect
to pi,ω is denoted by Ei,ω. In this paper, the probability distribution pi,ω is
taken to be a representation of player’s “subjective” beliefs. I will use these
probability distributions to identify whether a player is a wishful thinker.
Iw i l ld e ﬁne a wishful thinker as a player who expects to enjoy the highest
payoﬀ that is possible given her information about the other players’ strategies
and given that she can choose any of her own strategies. A player i is said to
be a wishful thinker at ω if and only if
(2.1) Ei,ω [ui (σ)] = max
ν=δsi×µ
Eν [ui (s)],
where maximization is taken over all beliefs ν = δsi × µ on Si × σ−i (Ii (ω))
in which the player knows her own strategy si.H e r e , δsi is the probability
distribution that puts probability 1 on {si},a n dσ−i (Ii (ω)) is the set of all
strategy proﬁles s−i of other players played at some state in Ii (ω).N o t i c et h a t
the standard assumption that player knows her own strategy has no bite in this
deﬁnition. In fact,
(2.2) max
s ui (s)=m a x
δsi×µ
Eδsi×µ [ui (s)] = max
ν Eν [ui (s)],
where s is maximized over Si×σ−i (Ii (ω)), and the second and third maximiza-
t i o n sa r eo v e rt h es e to fb e l i e f so nSi × σ−i (Ii (ω)) with and without the above
assumption, respectively. Clearly, one can rewrite the condition (2.1), so that a
player i is a wishful thinker at ω if and only if
(2.3) Ei,ω [ui (σ)] = max
µ,si
Eµ [ui (si,s −i)],
where maximization is taken over all beliefs µ on σ−i (Ii (ω)) and strategies
si ∈ Si. That is, the strategy and the beliefs of a wishful thinker are as if she
chooses her strategies and beliefs in order to make herself feel happy. Wishful
thinking can be deﬁned equivalently in terms of extreme optimism. To this end,
rewrite (2.3) as
Ei,ω [ui (σ)] = max
µ max
si
Eµ [ui (si,s −i)].WISHFUL THINKING 11
Hence, a wishful thinker can be considered as a person who chooses a belief to
maximize her payoﬀ knowing that she will act rationally with respect to her
beliefs. Hence, wishful thinking is maximal optimism under rationality.8 These
equivalent deﬁnitions are used interchangeably. The set of all states at which a
player i is a wishful thinker is denoted by Wi; W = ∩i∈NWi is the event that
everybody is a wishful thinker.
Notation 1. Write BRi (µ) for the set of best responses of player i against his
belief µ about the other players’ strategies. Write BRi (s−i) instead of BRi (µ)
if µ assigns probability 1 on s−i.W r i t e
Bi = {(ˆ si,s −i)|ˆ si ∈ BRi (s−i),s −i ∈ S−i}
for the graph of BRi on pure strategy proﬁles.
Remark 1. A player always knows whether she is to be identiﬁed as a wishful
thinker in this paper: if ω ∈ Wi,t h e nIi (ω) ⊆ Wi.T h e r e f o r e ,
(2.4) Ki (Wi)=Wi.
Remark 2. The ﬁrst equality in (2.2) shows that wishful thinking is an ordinal
notion. A player’s attitudes towards risk are irrelevant in determining whether
she is a wishful thinker at a given state. The strategic implications of wishful
thinking are invariant to monotonic transformations of payoﬀ functions. The
only non-generic situations one must ever rule out regarding wishful thinking are
indiﬀerences between certain pure strategy proﬁles. Addition of mixed strategies
t ot h eg a m ea sp u r es t r a t e g i e s ,a g a i n ,h a sa tm o s to n l yt r i v i a le ﬀect on the
strategic implications of wishful thinking.
8Extreme pessimism can be deﬁned similarly as the maximal pessimism under rationality.
A player is said to be extremely pessimistic at ω if Ei,ω [ui (σ)] = minµ maxsi Eµ [ui (si,s −i)].
That is, she holds the most pessimistic belief under the constraint that she acts rationally.
Notice that extreme pessimism is similar to (but distinct from) ambiguity aversion, deﬁned
by Ei,ω [ui (σ)] = maxsi minµ Eµ [ui (si,s −i)].12 MUHAMET YILDIZ
Remark 3. U s eo fA u m a n n ’ s( 1 9 7 6 )p a r t i t i o nm o d e li sj u s t i ﬁed on two grounds.
Firstly, it is considered to be the canonical model of interactive epistemology, as
it reﬂects the most stringent assumptions about knowledge, namely: a person
does not know a false statement as truth; a person knows whether she knows;
and she can use conjunction to make further inferences. Exploring the strate-
gic implications of wishful thinking within this model allows me to disentangle
the eﬀects of wishful thinking from the possible eﬀects that come form drop-
ping some of these standard assumptions of game theory. Nevertheless, all of
these assumptions have been challenged in modeling bounded rationality and
strategic uncertainty. It will therefore be important to extend the analysis to
such more permissive models. Secondly, my formulation of wishful thinking
requires a set of assumptions or an objective assessment of the world as a ref-
erence in addition to individuals’ subjective assessments. Aumann’s canonical
model perfectly meets this need as it consists of partitions of the state space
and conditional probability distributions. This allows a parsimonious model of
wishful thinking. In purely subjective models of beliefs, such as the universal
type space of Mertens and Zamir (1985) on the strategy space, one needs to add
such sets of correct assumptions or reference beliefs to the model. Since these
reference beliefs are irrelevant to the players’ decision problems, such a model
will be less parsimonious and may appear ad hoc.
3. Strategic Implications of Wishful Thinking
In this section, I will characterize the strategies that are consistent with wish-
ful thinking, mutual knowledge of wishful thinking, and so on. The character-
ization will be given by an iterative elimination process. Firstly, since wishful
thinking is stronger than rationality, common knowledge of wishful thinking will
lead to a reﬁnement of rationalizability, i.e., all non-rationalizable strategies will
eventually be eliminated. Secondly, any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies will
survive the iterated elimination process. More surprisingly, I will show that for
generic two person games, these are the only strategies that survive. This willWISHFUL THINKING 13
yield an unlikely epistemic characterization for pure-Nash-equilibrium strate-
gies.
The next lemma describes a deﬁning property of the strategies played by a
wishful thinker. I will use this property to deﬁne the elimination procedure.
Lemma 1. For any F ⊆ Ω, i ∈ N,a n da n yˆ s ∈ σ(Ki (F) ∩ Wi),t h e r ee x i s t s
(ˆ si,s −i) ∈ Bi ∩ σ(F) such that
(3.1) ui (ˆ si,s −i) ≥ max
si
ui (si, ˆ s−i).
The intuition behind this lemma is simple. A wishful thinker always plays
a best reply against some pure strategy proﬁle (by (2.2)). Hence, if a wishful
thinker plays a strategy ˆ si knowing that some event F is true, then she must be
targeting a best reply against a pure strategy s−i that is consistent with event
F. Moreover, the targeted payoﬀ, ui (ˆ si,s −i),c a n n o tb el o w e rt h a nt h ep a y o ﬀ
from playing a best reply to a strategy proﬁle ˆ s−i of others that is possible in her
information set. For otherwise, she would obtain a higher payoﬀ by believing
that the other players play ˆ s−i.
Lemma 1 rules out most strategy proﬁles as strategic outcomes when some
of the players are wishful thinkers. For any generic game and any two distinct
strategy proﬁles s,s0 ∈ Bi in which player i plays a best response, either
¡
si,s 0
−i
¢
or (s0
i,s −i) is eliminated depending on whether ui (s) <u i (s0) or ui (s) >u i (s0).
This leads to a powerful elimination procedure, which characterizes the strategy
proﬁles that are consistent with wishful thinking, mutual knowledge of wishful
thinking, and so on.
Elimination Procedure.
(1) Initialization: Set X−1 = S.
(2) Elimination: For any m ≥ 0, eliminate all the strategy proﬁles ˆ s that
fail (3.1) for some i and for σ(F)=Xm−1. (That is, eliminate ˆ s if there
exists i f o rw h i c ht h e r ed o e sn o te x i s t sa n y(ˆ si,s −i) ∈ Bi ∩ Xm−1 with
ui (ˆ si,s −i) ≥ maxsi ui (si, ˆ s−i).) Call the remaining strategy proﬁle Xm.
(3) Iterate step (2).14 MUHAMET YILDIZ
Note that this is an elimination of strategy proﬁles. Moreover, it contains the
iterated elimination of strategies that are not a best reply to a pure strategy. In
this elimination, if ˆ si is a best reply only to s−i and the strategy proﬁle (ˆ si,s −i)
w a se l i m i n a t e da ts o m ep r e v i o u si t e r a t i o n ,t h e nt h ee n t i r es t r a t e g yˆ si is to be
eliminated–even if some part of ˆ s−i is still available.
More formally, I deﬁne a mapping φ :2 S → 2S by setting
(3.2) φ(X)=X ∩
½
ˆ s|∀i :m a x
si
ui (si, ˆ s−i) ≤ max
(ˆ si,s−i)∈Bi∩X
(ˆ si,s −i)
¾
at each X where I use the usual convention that the maximum over the empty
set yields −∞. The sequence (X−1,X0,...) is recursively deﬁned by X−1 = S
and
X
m = φ
¡
X
m−1¢
(m ≥ 0).
The limit of the sequence is
X
∞ =
∞ \
m=0
X
m.
Since there are only ﬁnitely many strategy proﬁles, the elimination process stops
at some iteration m,a n dw eh a v eX∞ = Xm for some m. I will now illustrate
how the elimination procedure is applied.
Example 1. Consider the following two-person game, where player 1 chooses
between the rows, and player 2 chooses between the columns:
αβ γ δ
a 3∗,0 −1,0 0,0 0,2∗
b 0,0 2∗,1∗ 0,0 0,0
c 0,0 0,0 1∗,2∗ 1∗,0
d 2,3∗ 1,0 0,0 0,0
In this table, the asterisk after a player’s payoﬀ indicates that the player is
playing a best reply to the other player’s strategy at that proﬁle. Notice
that no strategy is weakly dominated, and hence all strategies are admissi-
ble (and rationalizable). Let us apply the above elimination procedure. Take
m =0 . For Player 1, the strategy d is eliminated, as it is not a best replyWISHFUL THINKING 15
to any pure strategy. For player 1 again, the proﬁle (b,α) is eliminated, as
max(b,s2)∈B1 u1 (b,s2)=2< 3=m a x s1 u1 (s1,α). Similarly, (c,α) and (c,β) are
eliminated. No other proﬁle is eliminated for player 1 at this round. For exam-
ple, (a,β) is not eliminated because player 1 targets the payoﬀ of 3, while she
can get only 2 by responding to β. For player 2, among the strategy proﬁles that
have not been eliminated already, (a,β) is eliminated as u2 (a,δ) >u 2 (b,β);n o
other proﬁle is eliminated. X0 consists of the strategy proﬁles in bold:
αβ γ δ
a 3∗,0 −1,0 0,0 0,2∗
b 0,0 2∗,1∗ 0,0 0,0
c 0,0 0,0 1∗,2∗ 1∗,0
d 2,3∗ 1,0 0,0 0,0
For m =1 ,s t r a t e g yα (or simply the strategy proﬁle (a,α)) is eliminated for
player 2. This is because α is a best reply only against d, but (d,α) has been
eliminated. There are no more eliminations for m =1 : X1 = X0\{(a,α)}.
For m =2 ,s t r a t e g ya is eliminated as a is not a best reply for player 1 in
any remaining proﬁle in the ﬁrst row. This is the only elimination. Hence, X2
consists of the boldface strategy proﬁl e si nt h es e c o n da n dt h i r dr o w sa b o v e .F o r
m =3 ,s t r a t e g yδ is eliminated. The elimination process stops here. Therefore,
X3 = X4 = ···= X∞ = {(b,β),(b,γ),(c,γ)}.
Remark 4. The elimination process is monotonic, i.e., X ⊆ Y ⇒ φ(X) ⊆
φ(Y ). Hence, the limit set X∞ does not change if one fails to eliminate certain
strategies at some step or applies diﬀerent orders.
The next result states that Xm is precisely the strategies that are consistent
with mth-order mutual knowledge of wishful thinking. Therefore, using the
elimination procedure above, a researcher can investigate the strategic impli-
cations of wishful thinking directly from the strategy proﬁles–without dealing
with abstract, complicated models of strategic uncertainty.16 MUHAMET YILDIZ
Proposition 1. For any model (Ω,I,p),a n da n ym ≥ 0,
σ(K
m(W)) ⊆ X
m;
in particular,
σ(CK(W)) ⊆ X
∞.
Moreover, there exist models (Ω,I,p) in which the above inclusions are equali-
ties.
The ﬁrst statement is given by inductive applications of Lemma 1. The
proof of the second part involves constructing a submodel for each strategy
proﬁle in Xm, where the strategy proﬁle is played at a state in which wishful
thinking is mth-order mutual knowledge. One constructs such a model using
information sets with only one or two states, and at such information cells,
Lemma 1 characterizes the wishful thinking behavior. Integrating these models
into one model, one obtains the desired model. I will next present a model for
the common knowledge case in Example 1.
Example 1 (continued). In the following model, wishful thinking is common
knowledge, and each strategy proﬁle in X∞ is played at some state. Take
Ω = X∞ and σ(ω)=ω at each ω. E a c hp l a y e rk n o w sh e ro w ns t r a t e g y ;
hence I1 = {{(b,β),(b,γ)},{(c,γ)}} and I2 = {{(b,β)},{(b,γ),(c,γ)}}.T a k e
also p1,(b,β) ((b,β)) = 1 and p2,(c,γ) ((c,γ)) = 1. This model is described in the
following diagram, where the information cells of Player 1 are rectangular:
(b,β)( b,γ)
(c,γ)
10
1
0
(b,β)( b,γ)
(c,γ)
10
1
0
Clearly, each player is a wishful thinker at each state, and hence W = K1 (W)=
K2 (W)=···= CK(W)=Ω = X∞. Therefore, σ(CK(W)) = X∞.WISHFUL THINKING 17
Notice in Example 1 that every strategy that is part of a proﬁle in X∞ is also
a part of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. This is, in fact, not a coincidence.
Let
NE =
\
i∈N
Bi
be the set of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria; recall that Bi is the set of proﬁles
in which player i plays a best reply to others’ strategies. Let also
NEi = {si|∃s−i :( si,s −i) ∈ NE}
be the set of all strategies of a player i that are played in some pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium. Similarly, let
X
∞
i = {si|∃s−i :( si,s −i) ∈ X
∞}
be the set of all strategies of a player i that is consistent with common knowledge
of wishful thinking. The next two propositions establish the close relationship
between the pure strategy Nash equilibria and common knowledge of wishful
thinking.
Proposition 2. Every pure strategy Nash equilibrium is consistent with com-
mon knowledge of wishful thinking:
NE ⊆ X
∞.
In a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium there is no strategic uncertainty, and
hence players do not have any freedom of entertaining diﬀerent beliefs. Hence,
all players, independent of their level of optimism, hold the same correct beliefs.
Formally, any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is consistent with a model with
a single state at which each player plays according to the equilibrium. In such
a model, it is common knowledge that each player is a wishful thinker. The
next proposition states a more surprising and substantive fact about two-player
games. The assumptions of this proposition generically hold.
Proposition 3. For any two-person game, assume (i) for each s−i,t h e r ee x i s t s
a unique best reply si ∈ BRi (s−i), and (ii) Player 1 is not indiﬀerent between18 MUHAMET YILDIZ
any two distinct strategy proﬁles s,s0 ∈ B1. Then, only pure Nash equilibrium
strategies are consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking:
(3.3) X
∞
i = NEi (∀i ∈ N).
Moreover,
(3.4) X
∞ = φ(NE1 × NE2)
= {(ˆ s1, ˆ s2)|∃(ˆ s1,s 2),(s1, ˆ s2) ∈ NE : u1(ˆ s1,s 2) ≥ u1(s1, ˆ s2),
u2(s1, ˆ s2) ≥ u2(ˆ s1,s 2)}.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition characterizes common knowledge of wishful
thinking in terms of strategies. It states that in a generic two-person game, the
only strategies that are consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking
are the pure equilibrium strategies. The second part gives a practical charac-
terization for the strategy proﬁles that are consistent with common knowledge
of wishful thinking. It states that this set can be computed by simply applying
the elimination procedure only once to the set NE1 × NE2.
The proof can be summarized as follows. First, under assumption (i), one
can show that the restrictions of the best response functions to X∞ (which are
deﬁned from X∞
j to X∞
i ) are well-deﬁned, one-to-one, and onto. Together with
assumption (ii), this allows one to rearrange the strategies so that B1 ∩ X∞
is equal to the diagonal of X∞
1 × X∞
2 and the payoﬀ of player 1 is decreasing
along this diagonal–as in Example 1. As in Example 1, this implies that all
the strategy proﬁles that are under the diagonal and in X∞
1 × X∞
2 must have
been eliminated. Using arguments similar to the one used to eliminate strategy
proﬁle (a,α), one then shows that if Player 2 does not give a best reply in a
strategy proﬁle on the diagonal, then the strategy of player 2 must have been
eliminated. Therefore, the diagonal of X∞
1 × X∞
2 is equal to NE.T h i sp r o v e s
(3.3). Since the elimination process is monotonic, (3.3) implies that the result
would not change if one started elimination from the set NE1×NE2.T h el a t t e r
elimination stops at the ﬁrst step, yielding (3.4).WISHFUL THINKING 19
This provides an unusual epistemic characterization for pure-Nash-equilibrium
strategies in terms of common knowledge of wishful thinking. More impor-
tantly, it suggests that there is little room left for optimism or pessimism when
the wishful thinking is common knowledge. In fact, (3.4) establishes that the
strategic uncertainty is reduced to uncertainty about the equilibrium played.
Nevertheless, common knowledge of wishful thinking is characterized by equi-
librium strategies–not by equilibria. As stated in (3.4), two players may play
equilibrium strategies that correspond to two diﬀerent equilibria at some state
in which wishful thinking is common knowledge. In such a state there is still
substantial strategic uncertainty remaining, and players exhibit a clear form of
wishful thinking. For example, at state (b,γ) in Example 1, each player incor-
rectly believes that they will play her favorite equilibrium. This is a general
fact. By (3.4), if the outcome ˆ s =( ˆ s1, ˆ s2) ∈ X∞ is not an equilibrium already,
then there are two equilibria (ˆ s1,s 2) and (s1, ˆ s2) ∈ NE that the players con-
sider as possible and rank in diagonally opposing orders: u1(ˆ s1,s 2) >u 1(s1, ˆ s2)
and u2(s1, ˆ s2) ≥ u2(ˆ s1,s 2). Each player plays according to her own favorite
equilibrium, believing that her own favorite equilibrium is to be played.
If the equilibria are strictly Pareto-ranked, then the players cannot have such
opposing rankings. In that case, the outcome is necessarily an equilibrium.
Corollary 1. Under the (generic) assumptions of Proposition 3, if the equilibria
are Pareto-ranked with strict inequalities, then
X
∞ = NE.
Proposition 3 has established already that for generic two-person games, when
wishful thinking is common knowledge, strategic uncertainty is reduced to un-
certainty about which equilibrium strategies are played. As in Example 1, one
can indeed construct a model in which wishful thinking is common knowledge,
all strategy proﬁles that are consistent with common knowledge of wishful think-
ing are played, and at each state each player assigns probability 1 to an equi-
l i b r i u m . T h a ti s ,t h ep l a y e r sa r ei na g r e e m e n tt h a ta ne q u i l i b r i u mi sp l a y e d ,
but they may disagree about which equilibrium is played. This is stated by the
following corollary, which is suggested by Haluk Ergin.20 MUHAMET YILDIZ
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, there exists a model in
which σ(CK(W)) = X∞ and for each ω ∈ CK(W) and i, pi,ω (σ−1 (NE) ∩ Ii (ω)) =
1, i.e., each player is certain that an equilibrium is played.
Remark 5. Common knowledge of wishful thinking diﬀers from usual epistemic
foundations for equilibrium, such as the suﬃcient conditions of Aumann and
Brandenburger (1995). For example, at state (b,γ) in Example 1, rationality is
common knowledge, but the players do not know each other’s conjectures, and
these conjectures do not form a Nash equilibrium. Notice that each player is
certain about the other player’s conjecture, but she is wrong.
Proposition 3 immediately implies that, for generic two-person games, exis-
tence of a strategy proﬁle that is consistent with common knowledge of wishful
thinking is equivalent to existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Corollary 3. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3,
X
∞ 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ NE 6= ∅.
The next two examples show that the assumptions in Proposition 3 are not
superﬂuous. The ﬁrst one shows that the characterizations need not be true
when there are three or more players.
Example 2. Consider the following three-player game where player 3 chooses
the matrices (λ and ρ denote the matrices on the left and right, respectively).
Below εi : S → (0,1), i ∈ N, are arbitrary functions; arguments are suppressed.
lr
t 2,−ε2,−ε3 −ε1,0,−ε3
b −ε1,−ε2,−ε3 1,1,1
lr
t −ε1,ε2,ε3 −ε1,−ε2,ε3
b ε1,ε2,3 ε1,−ε2,−ε3
Check that NE = {(b,r,λ),(b,l,ρ)}, but X∞ = S\{(b,l,λ)}, so that the non-
equilibrium strategy t is consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking.WISHFUL THINKING 21
Example 3. In the matching-penny game, X∞ = S, while NE = ∅, showing
that assumption (i) is not superﬂuous in Proposition 3. In the game
lr
t 2∗,2∗ 1∗,0
b 2∗,0 0,1∗
NE = {(t,l)},b u tX∞ = S\{(t,r)}, containing non-equilibrium strategies b
and r. Hence, assumption (ii) is not superﬂuous, either.
The next example illustrates that, in a generic two-person game, X∞ = ∅
whenever NE = ∅.
Example 4. Consider the following game with no pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium.
lr
t 0,2∗ 3∗,1
b 2∗,0 1,3∗
Now, X0 = {(t,l),(t,r)} as (b,l) and (b,r) are deleted at the ﬁrst iteration
for players 2 and 1, respectively. Since B2 = {(b,r),(t,l)}, X0 ∩ B2 = {(t,l)},
and hence (t,r) is eliminated. No strategy is eliminated for player 1, and X1 =
{(t,l)}.B u t ,B1 = {(t,r),(b,l)}, and hence X1 ∩ B1 = ∅. Therefore, X2 = ∅.
4. Ex-post optimism and its strategic implications
Wishful thinking serves well as an alternative benchmark to equilibrium. Nev-
ertheless it is clearly an extreme case. A general theory must then consider a
more general notion of optimism. Optimism is a straightforward notion when
there is no private information. In the presence of private information, there
are many diﬀerent notions of optimism, and the very task of ﬁnding a suitable
notion of optimism seems to be a challenge. Since strategic uncertainty must
involve some asymmetric information whenever it is present (as each player
knows her own strategy), a theory of optimism about strategies must face this22 MUHAMET YILDIZ
challenge. In this section, I will consider an apparently natural notion of op-
timism, namely ex-post optimism. I will show that its strategic implications
will be similar to that of wishful thinking. It will be clear, however, that this
is also a relatively extreme notion, and thus the challenging task of a suitable
non-extreme notion of optimism is left to further research.
4.1. Deﬁnitions. Ap l a y e ri is said to be ex-post optimistic at ω if her expected
payoﬀ at ω (according to her own expectations) is at least as high as her actual
payoﬀ at ω, i.e.,
(4.1) Ei,ω [ui (σ)] ≥ ui (σ(ω)).
Notice that, since each player knows her own strategy, the actual outcome at
any state is a distributed information among the players. That is, one can
ﬁgure it out by pooling each players’ private information. Hence, this is the
only notion of optimism with respect to a set of reference beliefs that contains
the distributed information among players. I will write Oi for the set of states
at which player i is ex-post optimistic; O = ∩i∈NOi denotes the set of states at
which every player is ex-post optimistic.
An ex-post optimistic player need not know that she is ex-post optimistic.
Indeed it will be an extreme case of optimism when one assumes that a player
knows that she is ex-post optimistic. This assumption corresponds to the event
Ki (Oi)={ω|∀ω
0 ∈ Ii (ω):Ei,ω [ui (σ)] ≥ ui (σ(ω
0))}
=
½
ω|Ei,ω [ui (σ)] = max
ω0∈Ii(ω)
ui (σ(ω
0))
¾
.
Here, player i expects to enjoy the highest payoﬀ available at Ii (ω).T h i sc o r -
responds to a somewhat weaker form of wishful thinking. It deﬁnes a situation
in which a player takes her own strategy as predetermined (as she knows it)
and chooses a belief in order to make herself feel happy. Hence I will call such a
player a fatalistically wishful thinker (at ω). The set of all such states is denoted
by ˜ Wi ≡ Ki (Oi). One can easily check that wishful thinking implies fatalistic
wishful thinking and hence ex-post optimism:
Wi ⊆ ˜ Wi ≡ Ki (Oi) ⊆ Oi.WISHFUL THINKING 23
Optimism alone is not related to rationality, and hence I will make separate
knowledge assumptions on rationality.
Notation 2. Write µi,ω ≡ pi,ω ◦ σ
−1
−i for the belief of player i about the other
players’ strategies at ω.
Ap l a y e ri is said to be rational at ω if σi (ω) ∈ BRi
¡
µi,ω
¢
.T h e s e t o f a l l
states at which player i is rational is denoted by Ri; R = ∩i∈NRi denotes the
event that every player is rational. Recall that rationality is implied by wishful
thinking:
(4.2) Wi ⊆ Ri.
The next example shows that all of the above inclusions can be strict.
Example 5. Consider the following game in which the column player can be
taken to be Nature:
lr
t 0,0 3,0
b 2,0 1,0
Consider I1 (ω)={ω,ω0} with p1,ω (ω)=1 , σ1 (ω)=σ1 (ω0)=b, σ2 (ω)=l,
and σ2 (ω0)=r. Clearly, Player 1 is rational at ω as b i st h eu n i q u eb e s tr e p l yt o
her belief that action l is played with probability 1. She is a fatalistically wishful
thinker (and thus ex-post optimistic) because she expects to enjoy the highest
possible payoﬀ at I1 (ω): E1,ω (u1 (σ)) = 2 = u1 (σ(ω)) >u 1 (σ(ω0)) = 1.B u t
she is not a wishful thinker, for she could have expected even a higher payoﬀ of
3, by being certain that player 2 plays r and playing t in response.
4.2. Strategic Implications. I will now investigate the strategic implications
of ex-post optimism and rationality. In analyzing the strategic implications of
wishful thinking it was very helpful to note that a wishful thinker always plays
a best reply to a pure strategy. Although this will also be generically true for
rational, fatalistically wishful thinkers, it will not be the case in general.24 MUHAMET YILDIZ
Example 6. In Example 5, consider the game
lr
t 0,0 3∗,0
m 3∗,0 0,0
b 2,0 2,0
instead, and let p1,ω (ω)=p1,ω (ω0)=1 /2, leaving the rest of the example
unchanged. Check that player 1 is rational and a fatalistically wishful thinker,
but she does not play a best reply to any pure strategy.
I will not make any genericity assumption for the general analysis. In general,
if a player i is a fatalistic wishful thinker at ω, then her payoﬀ is constant on the
support of her probability distribution µi,ω. If she is rational, she plays a best
reply against such a belief. Let BX
i be the set of such strategy proﬁles when i
knows that a strategy proﬁle in X ⊆ S is played, i.e.,
B
X
i = {s|si ∈ BRi (µi),s −i ∈ supp(µi),∀s
0
−i ∈ supp(µi):
ui
¡
si,s
0
−i
¢
= ui (si,s −i),
¡
si,s
0
−i
¢
∈ X}.
Clearly,
(4.3) Bi ∩ X ⊆ B
X
i .
Now, if a fatalistic wishful thinker plays a strategy, knowing that a strategy
proﬁle in X is played, then she must be targeting a payoﬀ level that is obtained
in a strategy proﬁle in BX
i .H e r p a y o ﬀ from the actual outcome cannot be
higher than this targeted payoﬀ.T h i si ss t a t e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gl e m m a .
Lemma 2. For any F ⊆ Ω, i ∈ N,a n da n yˆ s ∈ σ
³
Ki (F) ∩ ˜ Wi ∩ Ri
´
,t h e r e
exists (ˆ si,s −i) ∈ B
σ(F)
i such that
(4.4) ui (ˆ si,s −i) ≥ ui (ˆ s).
As before, this summarizes the restrictions imposed by rationality and fa-
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implications of these assumptions, I deﬁne a mapping ψ :2 S → 2S by setting
(4.5) ψ(X)=X ∩
½
ˆ s|∀i : ui (ˆ s) ≤ max
(ˆ si,s−i)∈BX
i
(ˆ si,s −i)
¾
at each X where I use the usual convention that the maximum over the empty
set yields −∞. I iteratively deﬁn ead e c r e a s i n gf a m i l y(Y −1,Y0,Y1,...) of sets
by Y −1 = S and
Y
m = ψ
¡
Y
m−1¢
(m ≥ 0).
Let Y ∞ be the limit set. This sequence is the outcome of the following elimi-
nation process:
Elimination Procedure for Ex-post Optimism.
(1) Initialization: Set Y −1 = S.
(2) Elimination: For any m ≥ 0, eliminate all the strategy proﬁles ˆ s that
fail (4.4) for some i and for σ(F)=Y m−1.C a l lt h er e m a i n i n gs t r a t e g y
proﬁle Y m.
(3) Iterate step (2).
Example 1 (continued). Now, apply this elimination procedure to the original
game
αβ γ δ
a 3∗,0 −1,0 0,0 0,2∗
b 0,0 2∗,1∗ 0,0 0,0
c 0,0 0,0 1∗,2∗ 1∗,0
d 2,3∗ 1,0 0,0 0,0
where Bi is indicated by a single asterisk, and BS
i = Bi.F o rm =0 ,s t r a t e g y
d of player 1 is eliminated. There are no more eliminations for m =0 .F o r
m =1 ,s t r a t e g yα of player 2 is eliminated. For m =2 ,s t r a t e g ya of player 1
is eliminated. Finally, for m =3 ,s t r a t e g yδ of player 2 is eliminated, and the26 MUHAMET YILDIZ
elimination process stops there. Y ∞ consists of the strategy proﬁles in bold:
αβ γ δ
a 3∗,0 −1,0 0,0 0,2∗
b 0,0 2∗,1∗ 0,0 0,0
c 0,0 0,0 1∗,2∗ 1∗,0
d 2,3∗ 1,0 0,0 0,0
The next proposition establishes that, using this elimination process, one can
indeed characterize the set of strategy proﬁles that are consistent with ratio-
nality and knowledge of one’s own ex-post optimism, strategy proﬁles that are
consistent with mutual knowledge of this, and so on. In the limit, one charac-
terizes the set of strategy proﬁles that are consistent with common knowledge
of rationality and ex-post optimism.
Proposition 4. For any model (Ω,I,p),a n da n ym ≥ 0,
σ(K
m(∩i∈NKi (Oi) ∩ R)) ⊆ Y
m;
in particular,
σ(CK(R ∩ O)) ⊆ Y
∞.
Moreover, there exist models (Ω,I,p) in which the above inclusions are equali-
ties.
Since wishful thinking implies both rationality and knowledge of one’s own
ex-post optimism (i.e., Wi ⊆ Ri ∩ Ki (Oi)), each set Y m must contain Xm.
Indeed, by (4.3), φ(X) ⊆ ψ(X) for each X, and hence Xm ⊆ Y m for each m.
Of course, Y ∞ is a subset of rationalizable strategy proﬁles.
The strategic implications of rationality and ex-post optimism may be signif-
icantly weaker in general. I will now provide conditions under which the gap
closes signiﬁcantly. Firstly, under the generic assumption that
(4.6) s−i 6= s
0
−i ⇒ ui (si,s −i) 6= ui
¡
si,s
0
−i
¢
(∀i,si),WISHFUL THINKING 27
BX
i ≡ Bi∩X, and hence a rational and fatalistically wishful thinker plays a best
reply to a pure strategy. Hence, the elimination procedure for ex-post optimism
requires elimination of strategies that are not a best reply to a pure strategy.
As shown in application to Example 1, this may lead to strong predictions. I
will now describe an important class of games, which includes many classical
models, in which the strategic implications of rationality and ex-post optimism
are the same as those of wishful thinking.
Monotonic Games. I will say that a game is monotonic if and only if for all
si,s 0
i,s −i,s 0
−i
ui (si,s −i) >u i
¡
si,s
0
−i
¢
⇐⇒ ui (s
0
i,s −i) >u i
¡
s
0
i,s
0
−i
¢
.
This condition is clearly satisﬁed in many classical applications, such as Cournot
competition, Bertrand competition, partnership games, and provision of public
goods.
Lemma 3. For any monotonic game that satisﬁes the generic condition (4.6),
φ = ψ.
The proof is based on two observations. Under condition (4.6), BX
i = Bi∩X.
In that case, for a monotonic game (4.4) implies (3.1). Lemma 3 immediately
implies that strategic implications of knowledge of ex-post optimism and ratio-
nality are the same as those of wishful thinking, as stated in the next result.
Proposition 5. For any monotonic game that satisﬁes the generic condition
(4.6),
X
m = Y
m (∀m ≥ 0).
In particular, generically, when it is common knowledge that players are ex-
post optimistic and rational, then strategic uncertainty is reduced to uncertainty
about which equilibrium is played.
Proposition 6. Consider any monotonic two-person game that satisﬁes (4.6)
and the conditions of Proposition 3, which are all generically satisﬁed. Pure28 MUHAMET YILDIZ
Nash equilibrium strategies are the only strategies that are consistent with com-
mon knowledge of rationality and ex-post optimism:
(4.7) Y
∞
i = NEi (∀i ∈ N).
Moreover,
Y
∞ = φ(NE1 × NE2).
Remark 6. Although ex-post optimism itself is a weak condition, the strate-
gic implications of common knowledge of ex-post optimism and rationality are
highly strong. This is because knowledge of ex-post optimism rules out equally
common case of ex-post pessimism. This is necessitated by the modeling as-
sumption that players cannot know a false statement as truth, namely the Truth
Axiom of the standard model of interactive epistemology, which is also used
here. Clearly, it is highly desirable to develop a more permissive model of op-
timism by considering some other notions of optimism and also considering a
more permissive model of knowledge, such as a Bayesian model with certainty
as the knowledge operator, in which one can assume “common knowledge” of
optimism, without assuming that a player knows that she is optimistic.
The following table summarizes the ﬁndings of this paper; S∞ denotes the
set of rationalizable strategy proﬁles.
Case Relationship
General NE ⊆ X∞ ⊆ Y ∞ ⊆ S∞
Two-person, generic NE ⊆ X∞ = φ(NE1 × NE2) ⊆ NE1 × NE2
Monotonic, generic X∞ = Y ∞
Two-person, monotonic, generic NE ⊆ Y ∞ = φ(NE1 × NE2) ⊆ NE1 × NE2
5. Conclusion
Self-serving biases are reportedly common. Moreover, given the elusive nature
of strategic uncertainty, one would expect to have more substantial self-servingWISHFUL THINKING 29
biases about other players’ strategies. It is surprising then such systematic bi-
ases about the other players’ strategies are typically assumed away by modelers,
even in the literature on optimism. What is worse, there is no game theoretical
framework that incorporates such systematic deviations from the common-prior
assumption–although the use of heterogenous priors about strategies is becom-
ing mainstream in game theory. In this paper, I take a ﬁrst step towards a theory
of such deviations, focusing on the extreme form of optimism, namely wishful
thinking. I develop a framework for analyzing wishful thinking about strate-
gies. I use the canonical model for strategic uncertainty to identify whether a
player is a wishful thinker and develop a straightforward elimination process
directly on strategy proﬁles to characterize the set of strategy proﬁles that are
consistent with wishful thinking, mutual knowledge of wishful thinking, and so
on. I further show that in generic two-person games, pure Nash-equilibrium
strategies are the only strategies that are consistent with common knowledge
of wishful thinking. In such games, wishful thinking can be common knowledge
only in cases in which strategic uncertainty is reduced to uncertainty about the
equilibrium that is played, and if a researcher assumes away asymmetric infor-
mation about whether a player is a wishful thinker in order to disentangle the
eﬀects of wishful thinking from that of informational diﬀerences, then he may
as well focus on equilibrium strategies.
With a slight modiﬁcation, I extend my analysis of wishful thinking to ex-post
optimism. For generic, monotonic games, the analyses of the two notions are
identical. Of course, ex-post optimism also becomes an extreme notion in the
standard epistemic model, once one considers a case in which players’ optimism
is known. Therefore, it is highly desirable to analyze other natural notions of
optimism–possibly in other subjective models of knowledge in which one can
assume common knowledge of optimism without assuming that a player knows
that she is optimistic. This rather challenging task is left to future research.
My analysis in this paper is elementary, raising the hope that one may be able
to develop a tractable framework to incorporate self-serving (or other) biases
into game theory.30 MUHAMET YILDIZ
Appendix A. Technical Appendix–Proofs
A.1. Strategic Implications of Wishful Thinking. I will now prove Lemma
1 and Proposition 1.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .Let ˆ s = σ(ω) for some ω ∈ Ki (F)∩Wi.S i n c eσi (Ii (ω)) =
{ˆ si} and the expectation of a random variable cannot be strictly higher than
the variable everywhere, there exists (ˆ si,s −i) ∈ σ(Ii (ω)) such that
(A.1) ui (ˆ si,s −i) ≥ Ei,ω [ui (σ)] = max
s∈Si×σ−i(Ii(ω))
ui (s),
where the equality is by (2.2) and the fact that ω ∈ Wi.N o w , s i n c e s−i ∈
σ−i (Ii (ω)), (A.1) implies that ui (ˆ si,s −i) ≥ maxsi ui (si,s −i),s h o w i n gt h a tˆ si ∈
BRi (s−i), and hence (ˆ si,s −i) ∈ Bi. Moreover, since ω ∈ Ki (F), Ii (ω) ⊆ F,
and hence (ˆ si,s −i) ∈ σ(Ii (ω)) ⊆ σ(F).T h u s ,(ˆ si,s −i) ∈ Bi ∩σ(F).B u t ,s i n c e
ˆ s−i = σ−i (ω) ∈ σ−i (Ii (ω)), (A.1) implies that
ui (ˆ si,s −i) ≥ max
si
ui (si, ˆ s−i).
¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .For m =0 , the statement, σ(W) ⊆ X0, is immediately
implied by Lemma 1. For any m, assume that σ(Km−1 (W)) ⊆ Xm−1.T a k e
any ˆ s = σ(ω) for some ω ∈ Km(W). Firstly, since Km(W) ⊆ Km−1 (W),
ˆ s ∈ Xm−1.M o r e o v e r ,f o ra n yi, ω ∈ Ki (Km−1 (W))∩Wi. Hence, by Lemma 1,
there exists (ˆ si,s −i) ∈ Bi ∩ σ(Km−1 (W)) ⊆ Bi ∩ Xm−1 such that
max
si
ui (si, ˆ s−i) ≤ ui (ˆ si,s −i) ≤ max
(ˆ si,s0
−i)∈Bi∩Xm−1
ui
¡
ˆ si,s
0
−i
¢
.
(The inclusion above is by the induction hypothesis.) Thus, ˆ s ∈ φ(Xm−1)=
Xm.T h e r e f o r e ,σ(Km (W)) ⊆ Xm.
For any given m, I will now construct a model (Ω,I,p) in which σ(Km(W)) =
Xm.F i x a n y ˆ s ∈ Xm. I will construct a model
¡
Ωˆ s,Iˆ s,p
¢
in which ˆ s ∈
σ(Km (W)). Then, the model with Ω = ∪ˆ s∈XmΩˆ s and I = ∪ˆ s∈XmIˆ s satisﬁes the
bill. Take some ω0 as the ﬁrst member of Ωˆ s and set σ(ω0)=ˆ s.S e tFm = {ω0}.
(I will deﬁne a sequence F0,...,Fm such that Fk ⊆ Kk (W) for each k.) For anyWISHFUL THINKING 31
player i,i fˆ s ∈ Bi, then set Iˆ s
i (ω0)={ω0}. Clearly, ω0 ∈ Wi for such a player i.
If ˆ s 6∈ Bi,s i n c eˆ s ∈ Xm,t h e r ee x i s t ssi,m−1 ≡
¡
ˆ si,s
i,m−1
−i
¢
∈ Bi∩Xm−1 such that
ui (si,m−1) ≥ maxsi ui (si, ˆ s−i). For each such i, consider a new state ωi,m−1 and
set σ(ωi,m−1)=si,m−1, Iˆ s
i (ω0)={ω0,ωi,m−1},a n dpi,ω0 (ωi,m−1)=1 .B yc o n -
struction, ω0 ∈ Wi for each such i.L e tFm−1 be the set of states that are deﬁned
so far. Recall that, for each ωi,m−1, Iˆ s
i (ωi,m−1)=Iˆ s
i (ω0) and σi (ωi,m−1)=ˆ si
have been deﬁned already. Now for each j 6= i, conduct the last operation again:
if si,m−1 ∈ Bj,t h e ns e tIˆ s
j (ωi,m−1)={ωi,m−1}, yielding ωi,m−1 ∈ Wj.I fsi,m−1 6∈
Bj and m − 1 ≥ 0,t h e nt h e r ee x i s t ssj,m−2 =
¡
s
i,m−1
j ,s
j,m−2
−j
¢
∈ Bj ∩ Xm−2
such that uj (sj,m−2) ≥ maxsj uj
¡
sj,s
j,m−2
−j
¢
. For each such j, consider a new
member ωj,m−2 and set σ(ωj,m−2)=sj,m−2, Iˆ s
j (ωi,m−1)={ωi,m−1,ω j,m−2},a n d
pj,ωi,m−1 (ωj,m−2)=1 . Once again ωi,m−1 ∈ Wj.C o n d u c t t h i s f o re a c h ωi,m−1,
and let Fm−2 be the set of states that are deﬁned so far. Clearly, one can deﬁne
such a sequence of sets Fm,Fm−1,...,F0,F−1 following the above procedure.
Set Ωˆ s = F−1. For the states ωi,−1 ∈ F−1\F0,f o rw h i c hσ(ωi,−1)=si,−1 ∈
X−1 = S, Iˆ s
j remains to be deﬁned for j 6= i;s e tIˆ s
j (ωi,−1)={ωi,−1}. Clearly,
such j need not be a wishful thinker or rational at ωi,−1. But by construc-
tion each player is a wishful thinker at each state in F0. Therefore, W ⊇ F0.
Hence, for each i, Ki (W) ⊇ Ki (F0) ⊇ F1,s ot h a tK1 (W) ⊇ F1. Similarly,
Kk (W) ⊇ Fk for each k ≤ m.I n p a r t i c u l a r , ω0 ∈ Fm ⊆ Km(W), showing
that ˆ s = σ(ω0) ∈ σ(Km(W)). Finally, for the case of X∞, such a sequence
of increasing sets could be deﬁned indeﬁnitely without ever going out of X∞,
and each player will be a wishful thinker at each state, so that wishful think-
ing is common knowledge, and at the initial state the ﬁxed proﬁle ˆ s ∈ X∞ is
played. ¤
A.2. Wishful Thinking and Nash Equilibrium. Here, I will explore the re-
lationship between Nash equilibrium and common knowledge of wishful thinking
and prove Propositions 2 and 3. The next lemma states some straightforward
but very useful facts about the elimination process and its relationship to equi-
librium.
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(1) φ is monotonic (i.e., X ⊆ Y ⇒ φ(X) ⊆ φ(Y ));
(2) NE is a ﬁxed point of φ (i.e., φ(NE)=NE);
(3) X∞ is a ﬁxed point of φ (i.e., φ(X∞)=X∞).
Lemma 4 immediately implies Proposition 2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .By Lemmas 4.2, 4.1, and the deﬁnition of X∞,
NE = φ
∞ (NE) ⊆ φ
∞ (S)=X
∞.
¤
Recall that
X
∞
i = {si|∃s−i :( si,s −i) ∈ X
∞}
is the set of strategies for player i that are consistent with common knowledge
of wishful thinking. Since φa (X∞)=X∞,e a c hs u c hs t r a t e g ym u s tb eab e s t
reply to a surviving strategy:
Lemma 5. For each i and si ∈ X∞
i ,t h e r ee x i s t ss−i such that (si,s −i) ∈
Bi ∩ X∞.
The next lemma establishes some useful facts for two-player games with
unique best replies. It states that X∞ is closed under best reply and that
the restriction of the best-response function to X∞
i is a bijection. Most notably,
part 3 states that, when applied to NE1 × NE2, the elimination process stops
at the ﬁrst iteration.
Lemma 6. For any two-player game assume that, for each i, BRi is singleton-
valued. Then, the following are true.
(1) |X∞
1 | = |X∞
2 |;
(2) For each i, there exists a one-to-one and onto mapping ρi : X∞
j → X∞
i
such that BRi (sj)={ρi (sj)} for each sj;
(3) φ
∞(NE1 × NE2)=φ(NE1 × NE2).WISHFUL THINKING 33
Proof. By Lemma 5, for each si ∈ X∞
i ,t h e r ee x i s t saρ
−1
i (si) ∈ X∞
j such that
si ∈ BRi
¡
ρ
−1
i (si)
¢
.S i n c e BRi is singleton-valued, ρ
−1
i is one-to-one. Hence,
|X∞
i | ≤
¯ ¯X∞
j
¯ ¯.S i n c ei is arbitrary, this yields (1). But (1) in turn implies that
the one-to-one function ρ
−1
i is also onto. Thus, ρi : X∞
j → Xi is well-deﬁned.
Since ρ
−1
i is a bijection, so is ρi, yielding (2). To show (3), check that, when
BRi is singleton-valued, for each ˆ si ∈ NEi, there exists a unique (ˆ si,s −i) ∈
Bi ∩ (NE1 × NE2). In that case, φ(φ(NE1 × NE2)) = φ(NE1 × NE2),a n d
hence φ
k (NE1 × NE2)=φ(NE1 × NE2) for each k. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .To prove (3.3), ﬁr s tn o t et h a ti fX∞ = ∅,t h e nb y
Proposition 2, NE = ∅,a n dt h u sX∞ = NE. Assume that X∞ 6= ∅.U s -
ing Lemma 6 and assumption (ii), one can rename the strategies as X∞
1 =
©
s1
1,...,s k
1
ª
and X∞
2 =
©
s1
2,...,s k
2
ª
for some k ≥ 1 so that B1 ∩ X∞ is the
diagonal of X∞
1 × X∞
2 ,i . e . ,
(A.2) B1 ∩ X
∞ =
©¡
s
l
1,s
l
2
¢
|1 ≤ l ≤ k
ª
⊆ X
∞
1 × X
∞
2 ,
and
(A.3) u1
¡
s
l
1,s
l
2
¢
is strictly decreasing in l.
Now, for any l>m , (A.2) and (A.3) imply that
max
s1
u1 (s1,s
m
2 )=u1 (s
m
1 ,s
m
2 ) >u 1
¡
s
l
1,s
l
2
¢
=m a x
(sl
1,s2)∈X∞∩B1
u1
¡
s
l
1,s 2
¢
,
w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a t
¡
sl
1,s m
2
¢
6∈ φ(X∞)=X∞.T h e r e f o r e ,
(A.4) X
∞ ⊆
©¡
s
l
1,s
m
2
¢
|1 ≤ l ≤ m ≤ k
ª
.
Now, I will use mathematical induction (on l) to show that NE = B1 ∩X∞.
Together with (A.2), this implies (3.3). For l =1 , by Lemma 5, there exists
s1 such that (s1,s 1
2) ∈ B2 ∩ X∞. But (A.4) states that s1
1 is the only strategy
that can satisfy this. Hence, (s1
1,s 1
2) ∈ B2. Together with (A.2), this shows
that (s1
1,s 1
2) ∈ NE. Assume that (s1
1,s 1
2),...,
¡
s
l−1
1 ,s
l−1
2
¢
∈ NE for some l>
1.S i n c e BR2 is singleton-valued (by assumption (i)), sl
2 6∈ BR2 (s1) for any
s1 ∈
©
s1
1,...,s
l−1
1
ª
. Hence, sl
2 ∈ BR2 (s1) for some s1 ∈
©
sl
1,...,s k
1
ª
;r e c a l l
from Lemma 6.2 that ρ2 is onto. But since
©¡
s
l+1
1 ,s l
2
¢
,...,
¡
sk
1,s l
2
¢ª
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(by (A.4)), it must be that sl
2 ∈ BR2
¡
sl
1
¢
,s h o w i n gt h a t
¡
sl
1,s l
2
¢
∈ B1 ∩ B2 =
NE. Therefore, B1 ∩ X∞ ⊆ NE.( NE ⊆ B1 ∩ X∞ by the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h i s
proposition.)
To prove (3.4), write
X
∞ = φ(X
∞) ⊆ φ(NE1 × NE2)=φ
∞ (NE1 × NE2) ⊆ φ
∞(S)=X
∞,
where the ﬁrst equality is by Lemma 4.3, the next inclusion is by Lemma 4.1
and the ﬁrst part of the proposition (i.e., X∞ ⊆ NE1×NE2), the next equality
is by Lemma 6.3, the next inclusion is again by Lemma 4.1, and the last equality
is by deﬁnition. ¤
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2 .Let Ω = X∞,a n dl e tσ be the identity mapping. Set
Ii (ω)={s ∈ X∞|si = σi (ω)} for each i and ω. By (3.3), for each i and ω,t h e r e
exists a (unique) Nash equilibrium ˆ s with ˆ s ∈ Ii (ω).S e t pi,ω = δˆ s.N o w , b y
(3.4), for any s ∈ Ii (ω),t h e r ee x i s t s(˜ si,s −i) ∈ NEsuch that ui (ˆ s) ≥ ui (˜ si,s −i).
Since ui (˜ si,s −i)=m a x s0
i ui (s0
i,s −i) (by deﬁnition of NE)f o re a c hs−i,t h i s
shows that ui (ˆ s)=m a x si,s−i∈σ−i(Ii(ω)) ui (s),s h o w i n gt h a tω ∈ Wi. ¤
A.3. Strategic Implications of Ex-post Optimism.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .Take any ˆ s = σ(ˆ ω) for some ˆ ω ∈ Ki (F) ∩ ˜ Wi ∩ Ri.L e t
˜ ω ∈ argmaxω∈Ii(ˆ ω) ui (ˆ si,σ −i (ω)) ⊆ Ki (F) ∩ ˜ Wi ∩ Ri.S i n c e ˜ ω ∈ Ri, ˆ si =
σi (˜ ω) ∈ BRi
¡
µi,˜ ω
¢
.S i n c e˜ ω ∈ Ki (F),s u p p
¡
µi,˜ ω
¢
⊆ σ(F),a n ds i n c e˜ ω ∈ ˜ Wi,
ui (ˆ si,s −i)=ui (ˆ si,σ −i (˜ ω)) for each s−i ∈ supp
¡
µi,˜ ω
¢
. Hence, (ˆ si,σ−i (˜ ω)) ∈
B
σ(F)
i . Moreover, since ˆ ω ∈ Ii (ˆ ω),b yd e ﬁnition of ˜ ω, ui (ˆ si,σ−i (˜ ω)) ≥ ui (σ(ˆ ω)) =
ui (ˆ s). ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .The ﬁrst inclusion is given by Lemma 2 as in the proof
of Proposition 1. To see the second inclusion, write CK(R ∩ O)=CK(R) ∩
CK(O)=CK(R) ∩ CK(∩i∈NKi (Oi)) = CK(∩i∈NKi (Oi) ∩ R). Then, the
inclusion is obtained by taking intersections on both sides of the ﬁrst inclu-
sion. One can construct a model with equality as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1. I will illustrate the main step. Fix any ˆ s ∈ Y m.T o w a r d s a m o d e l
¡
Ωˆ s,Iˆ s,p
¢
in which ˆ s ∈ σ(Km (∩i∈NKi (Oi) ∩ R)),t a k es o m eω0 as the ﬁrstWISHFUL THINKING 35
member of Ωˆ s and set σ(ω0)=ˆ s.T o w a r d s d e ﬁning a F0,...,Fm with Fk ⊆
Kk (∩i∈NKi (Oi) ∩ R) for each k, set Fm = {ω0}.F o r a n y p l a y e r i,i fˆ s ∈
BY m−1
i ,t h e nˆ si ∈ BRi (µi) for some µi with support {ˆ s−i,s −i,1,...,s −i,l} as in
(??). Consider new members ωi,m−1,1,ωi,m−1,2, ...,ωi,m−1,l, set σ(ωi,m−1,1)=
(ˆ si,s −i,1),...,σ(ωi,m−1,l)=( ˆ si,s −i,l).S e tIˆ s
i (ω0)={ω0,ω i,m−1,1,...,ωi,m−1,l}.
Set pi,ω0 (ω)=µi (σ(ω)) for each ω ∈ Iˆ s
i (ω0). Clearly, ω0 ∈ Ki (Oi) ∩ Ri
for such a player i.I f ˆ s 6∈ BY m−1
i ,s i n c eˆ s ∈ Y m,t h e r ee x i s t ssi,m−1 ≡
¡
ˆ si,s
i,m−1
−i
¢
∈ BY m−1
i such that ui (si,m−1) ≥ ui (si, ˆ s−i).N o w ,ˆ si ∈ BRi (µi) for
some µi with support
©
s
i,m−1
−i ,s −i,2,...,s −i,l
ª
. Consider, again, new members
ωi,m−1,1,ω i,m−1,2, ...,ωi,m−1,l, but set σ(ωi,m−1,1)=
¡
ˆ si,s
i,m−1
−i
¢
,σ(ωi,m−1,2)=
(ˆ si,s −i,2),...,σ(ωi,m−1,l)=( ˆ si,s −i,l). Iˆ s
i (ω0) and pi,ω0 are deﬁned as above. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Take any X ⊆ S. Suppose ˆ s ∈ X\φ(X). Then, there
exists i such that
ui (˜ si, ˆ s−i) ≡ max
si
ui (si, ˆ s−i) > max
(ˆ si,s−i)∈Bi∩X
ui (ˆ si,s −i) ≡ ui (ˆ si, ˜ s−i) ≥ ui (˜ si, ˜ s−i),
where the last inequality is due to the fact that ˆ si is a best reply to ˜ s−i by
deﬁnition of Bi.S i n c et h eg a m ei sm o n o t o n i c ,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
ui (ˆ s) >u i (ˆ si, ˜ s−i).
But by (4.6), BX
i = Bi ∩ X, and hence ui (ˆ si, ˜ s−i)=m a x (ˆ si,s−i)∈BX
i ui (ˆ si,s −i).
Thus,
ui (ˆ s) > max
(ˆ si,s−i)∈BX
i
ui (ˆ si,s −i),
showing that ˆ s 6∈ ψ(X). Therefore, ψ(X) ⊆ φ(X). Since the reverse inequality
is always true, this proves that ψ(X)=φ(X). ¤
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